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NOTES
When Fighting Is Impossible
A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO THE MILITARY’S
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION RULES
Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded,
because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of
armies; from these proceed debts and taxes . . . known instruments for bringing
the many under the domination of the few. . . . No nation could preserve its
freedom in the midst of continual warfare.
—James Madison1
Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.
—Carl Sandburg2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Presently, the United States stands alone as the world’s
unquestioned global military leader.3 Its military presence is felt through
over 820 installments in at least 39 countries.4 The United States’ active
duty military consists of approximately 1.38 million personnel equipped
with the most advanced and effective combat-related technology in the
world.5 In order to maintain and further this global preeminence, the
military relies on a constant and substantial influx of new members—
men and women willing to dedicate themselves to serving their country,
both in times of war and peace. At particular times in the past, most
recently during the Vietnam War Era, the armed forces have relied on a
1

James Madison, Political Observations, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 491-92 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
2
CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 43 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1964) (1936).
3
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. military
defense expenditures reached approximately $547 Billion (USD) in 2007. This number is the highest
in the world and accounts for almost half of the entire world’s military expenditures as of 2007. The
country with the next largest defense budget was the United Kingdom, spending approximately $60
Billion (USD) in 2007. STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE 15 MAJOR SPENDER
COUNTRIES IN 2007, available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf
(last visited May 31, 2009).
4
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (INSTALLATIONS & ENV’T), DEP’T OF
DEF., BASE STRUCTURE REPORT: FISCAL YR. 2007 BASELINE 6 (2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/BSR_2007_Baseline.pdf.
5
DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE (Aug. 31,
2007), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg0708.pdf.
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draft to fill their ranks, compelling involuntary citizens to become
soldiers regardless of those citizens’ wishes.6 In 1973, however,
conscription was abolished, leaving voluntary enlistment as the exclusive
source of military recruitment.7 Today, men and women choose to serve
in the military, and their enlistment is the product of a contractual
agreement.8 Every year, the United States military actively recruits and
enlists thousands of new members.9
That is not to say that maintaining current personnel numbers has
been easy. Since the Iraq War began in 2003, the number of deserting
U.S. soldiers has significantly risen.10 In the midst of a largely unpopular
war abroad,11 more and more enlisters are now seeking discharge from
their military duties, many times on the grounds of conscientious
objection.12 Under military regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75, these men and
women are allowed to seek discharge from duty because of their anti-war
beliefs.13 This regulation requires the military to discharge objectors if,
6

The Vietnam War draft was the first instance of conscription in the U.S. since World
War II. Norton Starr, Nonrandom Risk: The 1970 Draft Lottery, J. STATISTICS EDUC. (July 1997),
http://www.amstat.org/publications/jse/v5n2/datasets.starr.html.
7
Thomas W. Evans, The All-Volunteer Army After Twenty Years: Recruiting in the
Modern Era, 27 ARMY HIST. 40 (1993), available at http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/VolArm.html.
8
For an example of a military enlistment contract, see Armed Forces of the U.S.,
Enlistment/Recruitment
Document,
DD
Form
4/1
(Aug.
1998),
available
at
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf.
9
DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SEC’Y OF DEF., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS 10 (2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2005.pdf; News
Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for January (Feb. 10,
2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9308; News Release,
Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for September (Oct. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8944.
10
Army Desertion up 80 Percent Since Iraq War, MSNBC, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21836566/.
11
As of September 2007, an Associated Press poll of U.S. adults showed that only 33%
approved of the United States’ handling of the Iraq situation, while 65% disapproved. Ipsos Public
Affairs, Associated Press-Ipsos Poll, July 31, 2004-Aug. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm.
12
The Selective Service System defines a conscientious objector as: “one who is
opposed to serving in the armed forces and/or bearing arms on the grounds of moral or religious
principles.” See Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service, Select Service System: Fast Facts,
http://www.sss.gov/FSconsobj.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). Additionally, Professor Bernard M.
Dickens distinguishes between conscientious objection and civil disobedience, saying:
“Conscientious objection is refusal to undertake acts that would be lawful to perform . . . whereas
civil disobedience is related to refusal to act in compliance with mandatory public laws, such as on
conscripted military service.” Bernard M. Dickens, Ethical Misconduct by Abuse of Conscientious
Objection Laws, 25 MED. & L. 513, 514-15 (2006). Thus, to Professor Dickens, there is a legal
difference between opposition to mandatory conscription laws, which he classifies as civil
disobedience, and opposition to voluntarily-entered military service, which would fall under his
definition of conscientious objection. Id. However, the law itself does not readily distinguish
between the two situations. This Note argues that in the military context, the law should treat these
positions differently.
13
See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (2006); Harris v. Schlesinger, 526 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing “a national policy . . . not to subject bona fide conscientious objectors to combatant
training and service in the armed forces”). As of June 19, 2007, 32 C.F.R § 75 has been removed as
part of a Department of Defense exercise to remove CFR sections no longer required to be codified.
The corresponding regulation is found at Dep’t of Def. Instruction No. 1300.06, Conscientious
Objectors (May 5, 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf.
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inter alia, their anti-war beliefs are shown to be “sincere and deeply
held.”14 While such requirements appear on their face to be straight
forward, courts have continually found difficulty both in interpreting and
applying these standards when reviewing the military’s decisions to deny
certain applicants of conscientious objection status.15
This Note advocates a perceptional shift in the way such
applications for conscientious objection are considered by the military
and reviewed by courts. Specifically, it argues that applications for
conscientious objection should be assessed under a traditional contractual
law paradigm, by importing the doctrine of impossibility as it relates to
an individual’s fulfillment of military duties. This approach would allow
an enlisted member of the military to break his or her contractual
obligation to the military if and when fulfillment of that duty becomes
impossible due to new or changed circumstances. Such circumstances
would include the development of anti-war beliefs that were not present
at the time the parties originally contracted.
Part II.A provides background on the military’s current
conscientious objection rules as set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 75. It details the
military’s procedures regarding conscientious objection claims, from the
filing of a claim by an individual through the military’s evaluation and
decision-making process, to the judicial system’s treatment and review of
such military decisions.
Part II.B discusses the current split among courts regarding the
proper application of 32 C.F.R. § 75. It outlines the primary split into
three camps, which differ regarding what is required of an applicant to
successfully claim conscientious objection. It also discusses the possible
sources of this divide and the ramifications of this split on how
conscientious objectors are treated in various jurisdictions. Part II.B
highlights the problems with the approach of two of these camps—
namely, what will be termed the “sincerity camp” and the “modified
depth of conviction camp”—and the policy issues that accompany these
interpretations of the military’s discharge rules.
The language and structure of DoD Instuction 1300.06 is largely the same as its C.F.R. predecessor.
For purposes of this Note, 32 C.F.R. § 75 will be referenced in lieu of DoD 1300.06 due to the fact
that all case law on the matter references the C.R.F. version exclusively.
14
See 32 C.F.R. § 75(a)(3); see also infra Part II.A. DoD Instruction 1300.06 alters this
language slightly to: “Whose position is firm, fixed, sincere and deeply held.” It is unclear at this
time whether this slight alteration in language will have any legal consequences, as courts have yet
to address the DoD Instruction when assessing conscientious objection claims.
15
See infra Part II.B. The Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit require conscientious
objection applicants to hold antiwar beliefs that are both sincere and deeply held. See Alhassan v.
Hagee, 424 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2005); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1996).
The First Circuit and Eighth Circuit, however, have rejected the “deeply held” requirement,
analyzing only whether the applicant’s beliefs are sincere. See Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938
F.2d 1449, 1459 (1st Cir. 1991); Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1971). The Fifth
Circuit is unclear on whether it upholds the “deeply held” requirement. See Kurtz v. Laird, 455 F.2d
965, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) (rejecting depth of conviction as separate requirement). But see Lipton v.
Peters, No. CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999) (holding
that sincerity and depth of conviction are separate and relevant inquiries).
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Part III discusses the fundamentals of contract law, particularly
the various theories of contract law and how they apply to today’s
military/enlister relationship.
Part IV focuses on the impossibility doctrine as a potential
contractual defense to performing one’s military duties in lieu of the
various existing interpretations of the conscientious objection test
embodied in 32 C.F.R. § 75. While acknowledging that this approach
may, in a sense, beg the essential question by leaving open the issue of
what determines when performing one’s military duties should be
deemed impossible, it is argued that this approach creates a more
workable and consistent framework within which to assess conscientious
objection claims. This is accomplished by requiring an applicant to prove
that, in light of his or her sincere and deeply held anti-war beliefs,
partaking in military service is utterly impossible. This “change of heart”
or “revelation” that takes place after enlistment constitutes a new or
changed circumstance that was unknown to the parties at the time of
contracting, thus rendering any contractual obligations null and void.
Finally, Part V argues that this perceptional shift would have the
primary effect of acknowledging and more accurately reflecting the
contractual nature of today’s voluntary military enlistment procedures
and the military’s reliance on such contractual commitments. In addition,
the impossibility defense places an emphasis on the individual
conscientious objector’s actual ability to partake in military activities,
while deemphasizing the role of the source of a potential conscientious
objector’s anti-war beliefs. In doing so, this approach eliminates any
religious or nonreligious distinctions put forth by what will be termed the
“modified depth of conviction” camp, by requiring the applicant to prove
that his or her beliefs are of such strength and depth that performing
military duty is impossible, regardless of the source of those beliefs.
Additionally, the adoption of this approach would show deference to the
military and make clear the appropriateness of the plain language of 32
C.F.R. § 75 by requiring conscientious objection beliefs to be both
sincere and deeply held.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Winding Road to Conscientious Objection

Initially promulgated in 1971, military regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75
sets forth the conditions under which the military must discharge one of
its members due to conscientious objection to war.16 It says in pertinent
part:
16

Pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction 1300.06, each branch of the armed
forces has implemented its own specific administrative codes and regulations for discharge. Dep’t of
Def. Instruction No. 1300.06, Conscientious Objectors (May 5, 2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf. However, each branch contains a
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(a) Consistent with the national policy to recognize the claims of bona fide
conscientious objectors in the military service, an application for classification
as a conscientious objector may be approved . . . for any individual: (1) Who is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form; (2) Whose
opposition is founded on religious training and beliefs; and (3) Whose position
is sincere and deeply held.”17

The burden is on the conscientious objector to “establish by clear
and convincing evidence that” he or she satisfies each prong of the
discharge test.18 Regarding the first prong, “war in any form” means “all
wars rather than” any particular conflict.19 Regarding the second prong,
the phrase “[r]eligious training and beliefs” is defined as any belief
system, either traditionally religious or simply a non-religious ethical or
moral code of conduct.20
In order to be granted discharge, a potential conscientious
objector must file an application with his or her immediate commanding
officer within his or her particular branch of the armed forces.21 The
application is then processed and sent to an agency at department
headquarters.22 In the Army, for example, this agency is called the
Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board
(DACORB) or Conscientious Objector Review Board (CORB).23 Once
the application has been filed and processed, the person seeking
discharge is interviewed by various individuals in an effort to determine
conscientious objection code that is either identical to, or consistent with, 32 C.F.R. § 75. See, e.g.,
Dep’t of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 1306.16E (Nov. 21, 1986), available at
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%201306.16E.pdf; BUREAU OF NAVAL
PERSONNEL, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 11, § 1900-010(1)(e)
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/F1C39188-BF0E-41AE-8646A3B015EADAD7/0/Milpers.pdf; Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious
Objection § 1.5, at 1 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf;
Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-3204, Procedures for Applying as a Conscientious
Objector § 1.5, at 2 (July 15, 1994), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/
AFI36-3204.pdf.
17
32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) (emphasis added).
18
Id. § 75.5(d).
19
Id. § 75.5(b)(1) (emphasis added).
20
Id. § 75.5(c). The Supreme Court, in separate opinions, interpreted the term “religious
training and belief” broadly so as to include nontraditional as well as traditional religion expression.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (recognizing the validity of deeply held
moral convictions, regardless of whether those convictions were tied to the traditional Christian
god); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (defining “religious training and belief”
as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation”); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (finding that
the Military Selective Service Act dealing with conscientious objection does not violate
establishment clause by working a de facto discrimination among religions).
21
See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection
§ 2-1(a), at 2-3 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.
Applications include relevant personal information of the applicant and an optional statement. Id.
Since all military branches implement similar procedures regarding conscientious objection
discharge, the Army and the Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board will
serve as primary examples for illustrating discharge protocol.
22
See, e.g., id.
23
See, e.g., Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Helwick v. Laird,
438 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1971).
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whether he or she qualifies for conscientious objector status.24 In an
effort to better understand the applicant’s moral beliefs and perspectives,
these interviewers often include a military unit chaplain.25 Chaplains
must forward the results of their interviews to the DACORB.26 These
results include the chaplain’s opinions regarding the source and nature of
the applicant’s claims, the sincerity and depth of the anti-war beliefs, and
any other comments regarding the applicant’s general lifestyle and
demeanor that are deemed relevant.27 The chaplain does not, however,
explicitly recommend for or against the applicant’s conscientious
objection discharge.28
Applicants are also interviewed by an Army psychiatrist or other
medical officer in order to obtain an accurate picture of the applicant’s
overall physical and mental state.29 While the psychiatrist must report any
findings of psychological disorder, again, no outright recommendation
for or against discharge is made to the DACORB.30
Other possible interviewers include various higher ranking
officials within the applicant’s training or battle groups.31 Ostensibly,
these officials have had the opportunity to observe the applicant on a
day-to-day basis, and therefore have a basic sense of who the applicant is
as a person.32 Finally, the DACORB will assign its own investigating
officer to the applicant’s case.33 This official will conduct an informal
hearing with the applicant and collect any other information deemed
relevant to the conscientious objection inquiry.34 During this time, the
applicant may submit a personal statement on his own behalf, along with
any other evidence, such as recommendations or statements from family
and friends.35

24

Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-2(e), at 3
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.
25
See, e.g., id.; see also Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2005)
(applicant met with Army chaplain, psychiatrist, and superiors); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76
F.3d 1052, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (conscientious objection applicant was interviewed by a
psychologist and unit chaplain); Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627, 628 (8th Cir. 1972) (petitioner
interviewed with priest chaplain and other supervising officials).
26
Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-3(a)(2), at
10-11 (Aug. 21, 2006).
27
Id.
28
Id. § 2-3(a)(2)(h).
29
Id. § 2-3(b); Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 520-21 (applicant met with psychiatrist and board
of superiors).
30
Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-3(b), at 11
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.
31
Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 521 (applicant’s file was reviewed by applicant’s Commanding
Officer and the Commandant of the Marine Corps).
32
Id. at 521.
33
Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-4, at 11
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.
34
Id. § 2-5.
35
Id.
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The compiled information is submitted to the DACORB by the
investigating officer, along with the officer’s opinion on whether the
applicant meets regulation definitions of a conscientious objector and the
ultimate recommendation for or against discharge from duty.36 An
applicant may apply for one of two conscientious objector
classifications: those willing to perform non-combatant military
functions (classed 1-A-O) and those unwilling to serve in any capacity
(classed 1-O).37 Once an applicant has filed for discharge as a 1-O
objector, he or she cannot then “compromise” by accepting a
classification as a 1-A-O objector if the full application is denied.38
The investigating officer must assess an applicant’s candidacy in
light of military regulation requirements (as originally set out in 32
C.F.R. § 75, and echoed in each military branch’s respective codes and
guidelines), including whether the applicant’s anti-war beliefs are
“sincere and deeply held.”39 The terms “sincere” and “deeply held” have
traditionally been regarded by the military as separate inquiries.40 The
term “sincere” means a belief is truly held. “Sincere” does not
necessarily connote “deeply held,” which means the belief is strongly
held.41 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that sincerity
“distinguishes between military personnel who genuinely believe
something, and those who lie about their beliefs” while the term “‘deeply
held’ distinguishes, from among those who are telling the truth, those
who feel strongly about their belief that participation in war is wrong,
and those who do not.”42 The military has strong policy reasons for
requiring an applicant’s beliefs to be both sincere and deeply held, and
36
37

Id. § 2-5(k).
See 32 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (2006); see also Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973 (D.C.

Cir. 2007).

38

Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-9, at 14-15
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf.
39
32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (a)(3).
40
See, e.g., Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2005) (The Marine Corps
found that the applicant’s anti-war beliefs were sincere, but denied conscientious objector status on
the grounds that his views were not deeply held, and thus the applicant did not fall “within the
definition of a conscientious objector as provided for in . . . the guidelines which govern
classification of conscientious objectors.”).
41
Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996).
42
Id. Factors commonly used to assess whether anti-war beliefs are deeply held include
any signs that the views are temporary, infirm, or not fully developed. These signs often include,
inter alia, the timing of the application, the amount of time the anti-war beliefs have been held by
applicant, and all outward manifestations/steps taken by applicant in accordance with his or her
beliefs. See, e.g., id. at 1059 (The court found that applicant, who claimed to still be trying to “find”
himself, lacked evidence of depth of conviction, saying: “[applicant’s] beliefs are based only on his
reading two or three books and watching two television documentaries. He does not plan to study
further . . . . The only change in lifestyle that he foresees (other than leaving the military) is possibly
to write letters for Amnesty International . . . .”); Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793-95
(W.D. Tex. 2006) (The military and court inquired into applicant’s changes in lifestyle in accordance
with newfound anti-war beliefs. Denying discharge, the court analyzed applicant’s statement that she
was still “growing up and finding out” what she stood for, determining that it was evidence that her
beliefs were “rapidly changing and evolving, rather than firm and fixed.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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some courts have noted that the intent of 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a)(3) is to
prevent already-committed soldiers from breaking their duties based on
mere changes of opinion, however sincere they may be at the time at
which they are expressed.43 As Part II.B outlines, however, other courts
have disagreed as to whether this military policy should be honored.
B.

Reviewing the Military’s Decision: The Judicial Split

When the Army denies an application for conscientious
objection discharge, its own regulations require the DACORB to provide
its reasons for denial to the applicant and to make those reasons part of
the record.44 Once denied conscientious objector status, the applicant may
turn to the courts for relief. This is accomplished by petitioning for a writ
of habeas corpus, literally claiming that the applicant is being held in
custody against his or her will.45
It should be noted that conscientious objection discharge is not a
constitutionally protected right.46 Though not required to discharge any
current soldier, the military has nonetheless promulgated rules such as 32
C.F.R. § 75 to allow for conscientious objection status.47 Generally
speaking, courts have historically shown deference to military authority48
and, more specifically, the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75.49
43

Roby, 76 F.3d at 1057 (“People sometimes have bursts of passion that amount to
sincere convictions about their identities, loves, career choices, political preferences and other
important matters . . . all based on little or nothing and changing frequently. The military has a
justifiable interest in ensuring that fleeting beliefs do not serve as a basis for ending one’s service
commitment.”).
44
Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 600-43, Conscientious Objection § 2-8(d)(3), at
14 (Aug. 21, 2006) , available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_43.pdf (“If a determination
[is made] . . . that the person’s request is disapproved, the reasons for this decision will be made a
part of the record. It will be provided to the person through command channels.”).
45
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2000) (The petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States,” because he is an enlisted member of the United States Army); see
e.g., Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[S]ervice members may
challenge their custody by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court . . . .”); Kwon v.
Sec’y of the Army, 2007 WL 1059112, at *1 (E.D. Mich. April 9, 2007). Before habeas petition may
be granted, the applicant must first exhaust all administrative remedies. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405
U.S. 34, 35 (1972). Alternatively, during the draft era, the military could seek to prosecute
conscientious objectors for willful refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces, thus giving
those convicted the opportunity to appeal in court and have their conscientious objection
applications reviewed. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971); Gilette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971).
46
See Aguayo, 476 F.3d at 978 (“In contrast to selective service registrants who request
CO [conscientious objector] classification under the draft laws, however, those who have
volunteered to serve in the military do not have a statutory right to apply for CO status.”); Sanger v.
Seamans, 507 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Discharge of conscientious objectors from military
service is required neither by the Constitution nor by statute.”). However, once the military has set
its own conscientious objection regulations in place, it must follow them. See Hollingsworth v.
Balcom, 441 F.2d 419, 421-22 (6th Cir. 1971) (as an administrative agency, the military must follow
its own rules in order “to prevent the arbitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency’s
violation of its own procedures”).
47
See 32 C.F.R. § 75 (2006).
48
For a more in-depth examination of the Military Deference Doctrine, see John F.
O’Connor, Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66
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This judicial deference to military decisions is embodied in the
standard of review employed in such habeas cases. Courts review the
military’s factual findings of whether an applicant’s beliefs constitute
conscientious objection for a basis in fact.50 This review has been
described as the “narrowest known to the law.”51 While courts are left
with little room to overturn the factual determinations of the military,
they may review questions of law regarding the proper interpretation and
application of the military’s conscientious objection tests de novo.52 This
distinction between questions of law and fact has important
consequences; if the military determines that an applicant does not
qualify for conscientious objection on the grounds that his or her antiwar views, while sincere, are not deeply held, a reviewing court must
apply basis in fact deference to the determination that the depth of
conviction requirement was not met.53 However, the court may decide
not to apply the depth of conviction requirement at all in assessing a
conscientious objection claim, determining that sincerity is all that is
required of an applicant’s anti-war beliefs to qualify for discharge.54 In
such situations, the applicant’s habeas corpus petition is granted, thus
reversing the military’s decision to deny discharge on the grounds that
the applicant satisfied all elements of the military’s own conscientious
objection test.55
MD. L. REV. 668, 675 (2007) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has found it appropriate to defer in reviewing
regulations adopted by military officials acting as the proxies of those to whom control of the
national defense has been constitutionally committed . . . .”).
49
See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1476-77 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As we
consider . . . [32 C.F.R. § 75] in this case . . . we are guided by another long-settled rule: The
military’s ‘considered professional judgment,’ is ‘not lightly to be overruled by the judiciary . . . .’ It
is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.
. . . Our review, therefore, is as deferential as our constitutional responsibilities permit.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Roby v. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Where a regulation is not being challenged on constitutional grounds we owe the military
great deference.”). For an overview of the existence of and reasons for the Supreme Court’s
deference to the military since WWI, see Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A
Critical Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 19182004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907 (2006).
50
Hopkins v. Schlesinger, 515 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The Army’s
determination that a serviceman does not meet its test of a conscientious objector is final if there is a
basis in fact for it.”). This is not to say that basis in fact review lacks all bite. As the First Circuit
states, the military may not deny conscientious objection status merely because it disbelieves the
applicant; it must show “hard, reliable, provable facts” for denying discharge in order to be afforded
basis in fact review. Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449, 1454 (1st Cir. 1991). These
facts must be “discoverable from the record.” Id. at 1455.
51
Dewalt v. Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, GA, 476 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973);
Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[O]ur scope of review is limited to
ascertaining whether there is any basis in fact for the Army’s finding that an individual has not
presented a valid conscientious objector claim.”).
52
See Morgan v. Dretke, 433 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 2005).
53
See Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1971).
54
The court may reach this conclusion for reasons discussed infra Part II.B. See also
Helwick, 438 F.2d at 963.
55
There are several examples of courts reversing discharge denials due to lack of depth
of conviction because the courts chose not to apply the depth of conviction requirement. See, e.g.,
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The Supreme Court tackled the issue of reviewing conscientious
objection decisions in a series of cases during the Vietnam War Era of
the 1960s and 70s.56 The Court in United States v. Clay set forth what it
saw as the appropriate test for determining the validity of an individual’s
conscientious objection claim.57 The Court said that to qualify for
conscientious objection, an applicant “must show that he is
conscientiously opposed to war in any form . . . [h]e must show that this
opposition is based upon religious training and belief . . . [a]nd he must
show that this objection is sincere.”58 Notably, the “deeply held” aspect
of the current 32 C.F.R. § 75 test’s third prong was absent. Underscoring
this omission, the Supreme Court in Seeger v. United States stated that in
determining whether a particular applicant qualified for conscientious
objection discharge, “[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in [the
applicant’s] own scheme of things, religious.”59 Furthermore, the Court
in Witmer v. United States stated that the “ultimate question” is the
applicant’s “sincerity . . . in objecting, on religious grounds, to
participation in war in any form.”60
Despite the Supreme Court’s omission of the depth of conviction
test in these cases, the Court in Welsh v. United States later appeared to
require conscientious objectors’ beliefs to be deeply held.61 Unlike Clay,
the Welsh court did not explicitly enumerate the test for conscientious
objection. The Court did, however, hint that depth of conviction was a
required component of conscientious objection claims, saying:
[Applicant’s] objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come
from a ‘still, small voice of conscience’; rather, for [him] that voice was so loud and
insistent that . . . [he] preferred to go to jail rather than serve . . . . There was never any
62
question about the sincerity and depth of . . . [his] convictions . . . .

Additionally, the Welsh Court named two groups of applicants that may
be denied conscientious objector status: those “whose objection to war
does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle . . . .” and
“those whose [anti-war] beliefs are not deeply held.”63 Thus, an applicant
who lacked traditional religious beliefs could still be awarded
conscientious objector status as long as the applicant “deeply” felt antiHager, 938 F.2d at 1459; Kemp v. Bradley 457 F.2d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1972); Helwick, 438 F.2d
at 963-64.
56
Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 698 (1971); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 439 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1970); see also Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
57
Clay, 403 U.S. at 700.
58
Id. at 700; see also Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
176 (1965); Witmer 348 U.S. at 376.
59
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185.
60
Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381.
61
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342.
62
See id. at 337 (emphasis added).
63
See id. at 342 (emphasis added).
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war convictions that were “purely ethical or moral in source and
content.”64 Thus, the Welsh court, by extending conscientious objection
status to anyone with deeply held beliefs regardless of whether they were
religious, ethical, or moral in nature, appeared to place emphasis on the
strength of the applicant’s beliefs rather than the source of those views.
The ambiguous and seemingly contradictory sentiments
expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the depth of conviction prong
have created a rift among the Circuits. Courts generally fall into one of
three camps regarding the application of the military’s conscientious
objection regulations: the first, treating the depth of conviction test as
distinct from, and an additional inquiry to, the sincerity test;65 the second,
removing the depth of conviction test as either redundant, by equating it
with the sincerity test, or unnecessary due to its subjectivity and
difficulty of application;66 and the third, employing the depth of
conviction test solely as a means of evaluating an applicant’s nonreligious moral or ethical anti-war beliefs.67
The first school of thought, which will be referred to as the
“depth of conviction camp,” has been adopted primarily by the Ninth
Circuit and Seventh Circuit.68 The court in Roby v. U.S. Department of
the Navy recognized the need for conscientious objection applicants’
anti-war beliefs to be both sincere and deeply held, stating that the Ninth
Circuit has “applied all elements of the military’s conscientious objector
test” for decades, and thus will continue to apply the “requirement that
the applicant show that his beliefs are deeply held.”69 In its critique of
other circuits which have failed to uphold the “depth of conviction”
requirement, the Roby court stated that it was “puzzled” at “the lack of
deference to the military’s own regulations” in the circuits rejecting the
depth of conviction test.70 Roby stated that these opposing circuits fail to
consider the issue of “whether the court has authority to disregard the
military’s test for conscientious objectors, but disregards it
nonetheless.”71
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized the military’s need for
conscientious objection beliefs to be deeply held.72 The court in Alhassan
v. Hagee claimed that courts do not have the authority to refuse to follow
64

See id. at 340.
See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
66
See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
67
See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text; see also Hackett v. Laird, 326 F. Supp.
1075 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
68
See, e.g., Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1996); Alhassan v.
Hagee, 424 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2005).
69
Roby, 76 F.3d at 1058; see also U. S. v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1970)
(saying only applicants whose anti-war beliefs are not “deeply held” may be denied conscientious
objector status).
70
Roby, 76 F.3d at 1056.
71
Id.
72
See Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 524-25.
65
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the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75.73 Thus, some courts have embraced
the depth of conviction requirement and found the act of disregarding the
test by other courts to be an inappropriate use of judicial discretion. The
depth of conviction camp applies the most stringent standard for proving
conscientious objection: that an applicant’s views be both sincere and
deeply held.
The second school of thought, which will be referred to as the
“sincerity” camp, has held that applicants should not have to prove their
anti-war beliefs are deeply held. This camp believes, for varying reasons,
that the sincerity test is the only relevant inquiry required for accurately
assessing one’s conscientious objection to war.74 This position has been
explicitly adopted by the First Circuit and the Eighth Circuit.75 While
currently unclear, the Fifth Circuit has possibly accepted this view as
well.76 In Hager v. Secretary of the Air Force, the First Circuit opined
that the depth of conviction test lacked an objective framework within
which to work, stating that the inquiry “becomes an impermissible
subjective look into . . . [one’s] heart and soul.”77 The Hager court relied
on the language of Supreme Court cases as the source of this
interpretation.78 Similarly, in Kemp v. Bradley, the Eighth Circuit found
practical difficulty in applying the depth of conviction requirement,
stating: “‘[d]epth of conviction’ requires theological or philosophical
evaluation. We think it unwise to adopt this more complex concept as the
requirement . . . .”79 Finally, some Fifth Circuit decisions seem to
characterize the depth of conviction test as redundant vis-à-vis the
sincerity test,80 as do the decisions of various other lower courts.81
73

Id. at 525 (“[J]udges are not military leaders and do not have the expertise nor the
mandate to govern the armed forces.”).
74
For a survey of the reasons why courts find the depth of conviction test irrelevant, see
Hager v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449, 1459 (1st Cir. 1991).
75
See id.; Kemp v. Bradley, 457 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1972).
76
The court in Hager characterized the Fifth Circuit’s position as understanding “depth
of conviction to be equivalent to sincerity.” Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459; see also Helwick v. Laird, 438
F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1971) (saying that “[d]epth and maturity” of views are not prerequisites to
conscientious objection, so long as the claimant is sincere; conscientious objection has “no necessary
relation to intellectual sophistication”).
77
Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459.
78
Id. The court cited Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955) (stating that the
“ultimate question” is applicant’s “sincerity . . . in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in
war in any form”), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (stating that sincerity test
is the “crucial issue”). Hager, 938 F.2d at 1459.
79
Kemp, 457 F.2d at 629.
80
See Kurtz v. Laird, 455 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) (The Army’s denial of
conscientious objector status on the grounds that the applicant’s anti-war beliefs, while sincere, were
not deeply held was reversed by the court, which said: “[I]n this case we can ascribe no other
meaning to the phrase ‘lacks the depth of conviction required,’ than that . . . [applicant] lacks
sincerity. We find no basis in fact in the record to support a conclusion of insincerity.”). The Kurtz
court proceeded to describe the depth of conviction test as “a nebulous concept” and suggested that
the test was being used by the Army as a “catchall” or “rubber stamp” to deny conscientious
objection applications. Id. at 967 n.3 (quoting Quamina v. Sec’y of Def., No. SA 71-CA-155 (W.D.
Tex. 1971)).
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According to the depth of conviction camp, the positions of these
circuits are problematic. As the Ninth Circuit in Roby argued, the fact
that a rule is “complex” or “difficult to apply” does not provide an
adequate reason for its rejection.82 Additionally, the depth of conviction
camp argues that the sincerity camp, by promoting an analysis that is
contrary to the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 7583 and its various military
branch progeny, ignores the history of judicial deference given to the
military regarding its own regulations and procedures.84 Compared to the
depth of conviction camp, the sincerity camp employs a less stringent
standard for proving conscientious objection; an applicant must merely
prove that his or her anti-war beliefs are sincere.
The third school of thought, which will be referred to as the
“modified depth of conviction” camp, limits the use of the depth of
conviction test to instances where the conscientious objection applicant’s
anti-war views do not stem from traditional religious sources.85 The
modified depth of conviction camp is not representative of any whole
circuits; rather, it is a school of thought that emerges sporadically in
various district courts.86 While this camp appears to directly contradict
the plain language of 32 C.F.R. § 75,87 it too seems to rely on Supreme
Court precedent as its source.88
81

Chapin v. Webb, 701 F. Supp. 970, 978 (D. Conn. 1988) (“[T]he Navy’s statement
that continued service would not deny petitioner ‘rest or peace’ is speculative” and was not an
appropriate consideration in determining “a conscientious objector discharge.”); Masser v. Connolly,
514 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“[T]here is no requirement that an applicant for a
conscientious objector discharge must show that continued service would ‘deny [him] rest and
peace.’ Petitioner need only show that he is sincere in his opposition to war in any form.”) (second
alteration in original); Reinhard v. Gorman, 471 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D.D.C. 1979) (saying “lack of
philosophical depth . . . cannot be equated with insincerity of belief”).
82
See Roby v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is not
clear that we have the power to set aside a regulation based merely on its subjectivity or difficulty of
application. We do not believe that these are sufficient grounds for ignoring our usual deference to
the military’s internal regulations.”).
83
That is, the conscientious objectors must have antiwar beliefs that are both “sincere
and deeply held.” 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a)(3) (2006).
84
Roby, 76 F.3d at 1056 (“We are puzzled at the lack of deference to the military’s own
regulation in . . . [the First and Eighth Circuits]. Neither opinion considers whether the court has
authority to disregard the military’s test for conscientious objectors, but disregards it nonetheless.”);
Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[J]udges are not military leaders and do not
have the expertise nor the mandate to govern the armed forces.”).
85
See Hackett v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (“Therefore, it would
seem that where one’s objection to participation in war in any form is based upon traditional
religious beliefs, ‘depth’ no longer serves as a meaningful criteria.”).
86
See id. (“[D]epth of conviction[] is a verbalism without any real meaning . . . .
Therefore, it would seem that where one’s objection to participation in war in any form is based
upon traditional religious beliefs, ‘depth’ no longer serves as a meaningful criteria.”). The Hackett
court, having found that the depth of conviction test is superfluous in the case of anti-war beliefs
grounded in traditional religion, concluded that: “‘Depth’ is used as a measuring device to determine
the degree of or intensity of ‘Sincerity’ and only applies in cases where conscientious objection does
not arise from a traditional religious belief.” Id.
87
32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (a)(3) (“[A]n application for classification as a conscientious objector
may be approved . . . for any individual . . . [w]hose position is sincere and deeply held.”).
88
This position represents a crucial misreading of Supreme Court precedent. While the
Court stated that military regulations “exempt[] from . . . service all those whose consciences,
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This position appears to be as problematic, if not more so, than
that of the sincerity camp. It draws distinctions between anti-war beliefs
that are rooted in traditional religious doctrine and those that stem from
nonreligious moral and ethical codes of conduct, raising potential
establishment clause conflicts.89 This distinction is drawn by demanding
a heavier burden of proof (i.e., satisfying the sincerity and deeply held
tests) from those with nonreligious anti-war beliefs, while requiring
religious applicants to meet the sincerity standard alone. This
interpretation allows religious applicants to essentially bypass the depth of
conviction test by invoking the name of traditional religion. It is precisely
this sort of distinction that the Welsh court sought to avoid.90 Thus, the
stringency of this camp’s conscientious objection requirements varies
depending on the type of anti-war beliefs being claimed by the particular
applicant.

spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they
allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war,” Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 344 (1970), this sentence takes the “deeply held” requirement, separates it from the sincerity
requirement, and inserts it directly in the “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs” requirement. Some
subsequent courts have followed this lead, requiring that an applicant show: “(1) . . . he is opposed to
war in any form; (2) . . . his objection is grounded in deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs;
and (3) . . . his convictions are sincere.” DeWalt v. Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, GA., 476
F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973). This subtle restating of the test has opened the door for courts to
consider traditional religious convictions to be presumptively deeply held, by interpreting the phrase
“grounded in deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,” id., to mean “grounded in religious
beliefs or deeply held moral or ethical beliefs.” See supra note 74 and accompanying text. This
reading is bolstered by the language in Witmer, stating that sincerity is the “ultimate question” when
dealing with “religious” beliefs. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955). Read together,
Welsh and Witmer may suggest that depth of conviction is only relevant when assessing nonreligious anti-war views. However, contrast this reading with other language in Welsh, which says
that conscientious objection, in order to comport with the First Amendment, must be “neutral” and
include equally those whose beliefs emanate from both religious and non-religious sources. Welsh,
398 U.S. at 356-61. Thus, it appears the Court was ultimately requiring beliefs to have strength and
depth, regardless of whether they were traditionally religious or not.
89
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see also Kent Greenawalt, Moral and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special
Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1629, 1635-37. Professor
Greenawalt discusses the nexus of individual morality and the law, concluding that:
[C]ourts should recognize a principle of prima facie equality between religious and
nonreligious beliefs and activities, such that the government cannot treat religious
activities more favorably than otherwise similar nonreligious ones, unless it has some
substantial reason to do so other than a theological premise or popular opinion that
religious beliefs and actions are more deserving than nonreligious views.
Id. at 1636 (emphases in original). Thus, according to Greenawalt, the Establishment Clause
prohibits the law from favoring one form of religious expression over similar, nonreligious
expression.
90
See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965). In
these cases, the Supreme Court held that non-traditionally religious beliefs must be deeply held (just
as traditionally religious beliefs must be), in order to eliminate the favoring by courts of any one
religion, thus preventing the drawing of distinctions between religious and non-religious views.
Modified depth of conviction courts have misinterpreted this Supreme Court language as requiring
only non-traditionally religious views need be deeply held. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 89, at
1626-27.
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Therefore, the state of the law regarding conscientious objection
to military duty is uncertain to say the least. With little substantial
guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue, individual circuits have
been free to apply the military’s conscientious objection discharge
regulations in a number of ways.91 This has resulted in disparate
treatment of conscientious objection claims by different courts, and this
lack of uniformity may intensify in coming years as the United States’
military activity abroad becomes more prolific.92 It is time to set a clear
and appropriate precedent. This precedent should take into account the
contractual character of today’s voluntary military enlistment
agreements. Additionally, it should be consistent with the notions of
judicial deference to the military regarding military matters and the
constitutional view of treating non-religious ethical beliefs as equivalent to
traditionally religious beliefs in terms of the amount of protection afforded
to them by courts. Parts III advocates for such a shift, towards the
application of traditional contract law to the military/enlister relationship.
III.

APPLYING CONTRACT LAW TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The Law of Contracts governs all aspects of human exchange.93
Typically, these exchanges involve goods and services,94 but may also
include the exchange of promises.95 Generally speaking, the tenets of
contract law determine which of these exchanges create a cognizable
legal duty between or among the exchanging parties.96 While there have
been many suggested theories for determining which obligations merit
legal force and which do not, each theory of contract presents its own
advantages and shortcomings.97
These theories may be applied to a given contractual relationship
for the purpose of assessing the agreement’s legitimacy as a legally91

See supra Part II.B.
U.S. military expenditures have been steadily increasing since 1998 and have
increased 2.84% from 2006 to 2007. See Christopher Hellman, The Runaway Military Budget: An
Analysis, WASH. NEWSLETTER (Friends Comm. on Nat’l Legislation, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2006,
at 3, available at http://www.fcnl.org/now/pdf/2006/mar06.pdf (2005 data); Friends Comm. on Nat’l
Legislation, Where Do Our Income Tax Dollars Go?, (Feb. 2008), http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/taxDay08.pdf
(2007 data); Chris Hellmen, Ctr. for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, The FY 2007 Pentagon
Spending Request (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/
fy07_dod_request/index.html (2006 & 2007 data); Chris Hellmen, Ctr. for Arms Control & NonProliferation, The FY 2007 Pentagon Spending Request (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/
policy/securityspending/articles/fy08_dod_request/index.html (2008 data).
93
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 1 (5th ed. 2006).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 15.
96
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 269 (1986)
(“We look to contract theory, in particular, to tell us which interpersonal commitments the law ought
to enforce.”).
97
Some of the more commonly offered approaches include the will, reliance, efficiency,
fairness, bargain, and consent theories. Id. at 270-77.
92
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binding instrument.98 Generally, courts implicitly use a combination of
these approaches in order to analyze different angles of a contractual
dispute.99 This contractual approach is directly applicable to the
military/enlister relationship. As discussed in Part I, the essential
character of the modern military recruit is quite different than that of the
Vietnam War Era draftee.100 The draft has since been abolished and
compulsory military service no longer exists.101 Today, men and women
voluntarily choose to serve their country, and do so by entering a
contractual agreement upon enlistment in which they certify to have
absolutely no conscientious objection to war.102 While these enlisters
receive training and education at the government’s (and thus taxpayers’)
expense, the military has justifiable reasons for wanting to prevent these
men and women from abusing conscientious objection discharge rules.103
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of cases which address at length this
fundamental change in the nature of the conscientious objector from
mandatory draftee to contractual volunteer.104
After applying the various theories of contract law to the issue of
conscientious objection, it is clear that the modern military/enlister
relationship is one deserving of formal legal protection. By signing an
agreement, the military enlister has outwardly manifested a subjective

98

Id.
Id.
100
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
101
See supra notes 6-8.
102
See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug.
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf. For an example of modern
military enlistment contract, see Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD
Form 4/1 (Aug. 1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf ; see also
Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2005); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d
1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 1996) (both cases illustrating examples of applicants who, at time of signing
enlistment contract, guaranteed, in no uncertain terms, that they were non-conscientious objectors);
Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp.2d 785, 787 (W.D. Tex. 2006). In Jashinski, the applicant signed
an Army National Guard enlistment contract, which contained the question “Are you now or have
you ever been a conscientious objector?” Id. at 787. The applicant answered “No.” Id.
103
For examples of conscientious objection abuse, see DeWalt v. Commanding Officer,
Fort Benning, Ga., 476 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973) (applicant claimed objector status only after
receiving education and training at government’s expense); Kwon v. Secretary of the Army, No. 0614825, 2007 WL 1059112, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2007) (petitioner filed for objector status upon
graduation from medical school, for which Army had paid approximately $106,000); Lipton v.
Peters, No. CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999)
(applicant filed for conscientious objector discharge three days before completing medical school at
the expense of the military).
104
See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 978 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[J]udicial precedents
involving claims to exemption from entry into military service because of conscientious objection
are applicable to requests for discharge on the same ground by those who voluntarily entered the
service.”). But see Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 524 (distinguishing between draftees and enlisters, and
finding that precedent regarding draftees was not applicable in the case of an applicant who
voluntarily signed a document stating that he or she had no “firm, fixed, and sincere objection to
participation in war in any form or to the bearing of arms because of religious belief or training”)
(internal quotations omitted).
99
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intent to be bound by an obligation to the military.105 This manifestation
takes the form of a signed enlistment contract106 and accompanying
statement, whereby the enlister states that he or she does not have, nor
ever had, an objection to the participation in war in any form.107 Thus, the
enlister is asked to explicitly announce that he or she is not a
conscientious objector at the time of entering service.108 In addition, the
enlister makes a promise to render present and future services to the
military.109 More specifically, the enlister agrees to follow military
enlistment procedures, to comply with training and other requirements,
and to be available to serve in whatever capacity agreed upon for a predetermined period of time.110 The military in turn reasonably relies on
such outward manifestations by the voluntary enlister.111 In exchange for
the enlisters’ promises, the military trains, houses, and many times
educates these enlisters.112 The military also provides other benefits once
the enlister has retired from active duty.113
While not a topic of discussion for this Note, there may be
potential asymmetry regarding the parties’ respective bargaining
power.114 Under a bargain theory model of contract law, however,
adequate consideration is given by both sides of the agreement.115 The
enlister’s promise to serve induces the performance of the military to
provide benefits.116 Likewise, such performance by the military (or
promise of performance) induces the enlister to pledge his time and
105

See Barnett, supra note 96, at 272. Barnett outlines the will theory of contracts,
concluding that legal force should be given to the subjective intent of contracting parties as
expressed by their outwardly-manifested actions.
106
Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug.
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf.
107
In the Army, for example, the recruit must sign Army Regulation Form 3286, which
includes the following paragraph: “I am not conscientiously opposed by reason of religious training
or belief to bearing arms or to participation or training for war in any form.” Dep’t of the Army, DA
Form 3286-67, Statements of Enlistment (June 1991).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Barnett, supra note 96, at 274. Reliance theories of contract lend legal force to an
agreement that gives rise to one party’s “foreseeable” or “justifiable” reliance on the promise of another.
112
Pursuant to the Montgomery G.I. Bill, voluntary enlisters who meet certain active duty
requirements entitled to educational benefits at the government’s expense. Montgomery GI Bill: Active
Duty: (U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs), http://www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/CH30/CH30_Pamphlet
_General.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). For detailed information on benefits for military service, see
Military Benefits, Military.com, http://www.military.com/benefits (last visited on May 31, 2009).
113
See supra note 112.
114
See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applicant claimed to have
been “misled by the recruiter, and [that] he expected to work in a hospital”). However, this type of
claim does not seem to occur often in conscientious objection cases.
115
Barnett, supra note 96, at 287. Under this theory, the premium is placed on mutuality:
“what solely matters is that each person’s promise or performance is induced by the other’s.” Id. at
287. One criticism of this theory is that by relying on the formal component of consideration,
bargain theory neglects to enforce informal, yet otherwise serious promises between fully-intending
parties. Id. at 289.
116
See supra 112.
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surrender his legal freedom.117 Thus, whether the will, reliance, or
bargain theory of contract is employed, the result is a fully formed and
binding agreement between the military and the voluntary enlister that
appears worthy of full legal force and protection. Once an exchange is
legally protected, the contractual obligations of the parties may be
excused only if certain contractual defenses are raised and satisfied.118
Part IV introduces and advocates for one such defense in the context of
conscientious objection: the doctrine of impossibility.
IV.

WHEN MILITARY DUTY IS IMPOSSIBLE

Once a legal agreement has been established between an enlister
and the military, there are several ways in which the contractual
obligations of one or both parties may be excused.119 These methods
include the contractual defenses of duress, incapacity, fraud, and
unconscionability,120 and the contractual excuses of mistake and
impossibility.121 Unlike the defenses, which deal primarily with how the
actions of the contracting parties support or fail to support a breach by
one side of an agreement, the contractual excuses contemplate situations
in which some outside event serves to explain and/or justify a party’s
contractual breach.122 This Note attempts to apply the excuses doctrine to
the military/enlister relationship.
First, the doctrine of mistake does not adequately fit this
relationship. As demonstrated in the seminal Peerless ships case,123
117

See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug.
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). In order to induce more enlisters to join, the military has had
to increase incentives targeted at voluntary enlisters. Fewer Army Recruits Have High School
Diplomas, MSNBC, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22779968/ (“Strained, in part, by
military operations in Afghanistan following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the military has had to increase the number of waivers and raise enlistment bonuses
to fill its ranks.”).
118
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-177, 261-272 (1981).
119
Id.
120
These defenses arise when a contract, through its formation, is deemed to be
fundamentally unfair. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 74-93. These doctrines are inapplicable to the
case of the military/enlister agreement, which is not seen as fundamentally unfair, either by its terms
or general formation.
121
Id. at 155.
122
Id.
123
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 36-38. (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng.
Rep. 375 (L.R. Exch.)). In this case, the plaintiff agreed to sell bales of cotton to defendant with
payment to be made after the arrival of the cotton in Liverpool. The agreement between the parties
stated that the shipment was to arrive on the ship named Peerless that was sailing from Bombay. Id.
at 36. However, there were two different ships named Peerless that regularly sailed from Bombay to
Liverpool, one leaving in October and the other leaving in December. While plaintiff shipped the
cotton on the December Peerless, the defendant refused to accept the cotton, arguing that the
agreement was that the cotton would be shipped in October. Id. at 36-37. The court concluded that
there was no binding contractual agreement between the parties. Thus, since the parties ultimately
meant two different ships, there was no “consensum ad idem” (agreement as to the matter). Id. at 37
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mistake is invoked in situations where the parties “misunderstand each
other’s initial intentions” and, as a result, find “that their apparent
relationship does not exist and never did.”124 Such situations undermine
the will and bargain theories of contract, as there is no mutually
understood exchange of inducements between the parties.125 This is not
true of the military/enlister relationship. Both parties, at the time of
contracting, are presumably well aware of each other’s intentions.126 For
the military to claim any mistake is absurd since it is the party that
drafted the actual written agreement.127 On the other hand, an enlister’s
claim of mistake would have no merit unless it is accompanied by an
additional defense claim such as fraud or unconscionability because,
unless the enlister was somehow deceived or pressured into believing the
terms of the agreement were different than those contained in the actual
contract, a claim of mistake is simply not supported.128 Generally,
voluntary enlisters are made privy to what is being signed and know the
consequences of such signing. Failure to make oneself aware of these
facts may be considered negligence or lack of due care.129 Thus, the
mistake doctrine is not a viable contractual escape to military duty for the
conscientious objector.
The doctrine of impossibility, on the other hand, may provide an
appropriate defense to the military/enlister contractual agreement.
Impossibility deals with the reality that human foresight is limited, and
thus not all future events can be accurately contemplated by a contracting
party at the time of negotiation.130 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, section 261 states that once a contract is formed, a party’s
performance “is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence
124

Id. at 155.
Barnett, supra note 96, at 271-72, 287.
126
According to the military’s own website, military.com, the first step for a person
hoping to enlist is to “Learn about the military.” 10 Steps to Joining the Military,
http://www.military.com/Recruiting/Home/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009) (providing detailed
information about the military recruiting process).
127
See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug.
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf.
128
Courts generally decline to order cancellation of a contract due to unilateral mistake
“unless some special ground for the interference of a court of equity is shown.” Bishop v. Bishop,
961 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ark. 1998); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 28 (2007) (“Thus,
courts may decline to cancel or rescind an instrument unless the mistake is not the result of
negligence or the lack of due care, or the enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable.”)
(internal footnotes and citations omitted). But see Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (applicant claimed he was “misled” by a recruiter when deciding whether to enlist).
129
13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 30 (2007) (“[C]ourts generally require the
party seeking rescission of an instrument to show that he or she has acted with due or reasonable care.”).
130
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 162-63. There is a distinction in the law between the
defenses of impossibility and of impracticability. Impossibility refers to situations in which
performance by one party is physically impossible, while impracticability means that adequate
performance of one party’s obligations may be substantially frustrated physically, financially, or
otherwise. BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS; EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 15.7.3 (3d ed. 2004). In
the context of applying these doctrines to the conscientious objector situation, there is little
meaningful significance in this distinction. Thus, for purposes of this Note, impossibility and
impracticability will be treated as the same doctrine.
125
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of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made,” and in such cases the “duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances
indicate the contrary.”131 As Chirelstein explains: “Every future
contingent state of the world cannot be predicted . . . . But even if the
contract is planned and drafted with the greatest care and patience,
‘things’ may happen that are not explicitly dealt with and that make
performance difficult or impossible to carry out.”132 The modern doctrine
of impossibility (sometimes referred to as commercial impracticability)
is illustrated in the famous case Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United
States.133 However, courts apply the standards for the
impossibility/impracticability defense strictly.134 A party may invoke the
doctrine by showing that it had the ability to perform a duty at the time at
which the contract was made, but that circumstances changed due to
events beyond the control of either party which rendered performance
impossible or impracticable.135 Generally, the impossibility defense has
only been held to apply in circumstances of objective impossibility; that
is, “only when destruction of the subject matter or the means of
performance makes performance objectively impossible.”136 A number of
131

Thus, under the Restatement, in order for a party to be discharged from their
contractual duties due to impossibility, there must be: (1) no fault on the part of the party claiming
impossibility; (2) the occurrence of an event which was assumed not to occur at the time of
contracting; and (3) the contractual language or circumstances indicate otherwise. If these elements
can be shown by a conscientious objection applicant, the applicant’s contractual duties should be
excused. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
132
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 163; see also Vincent v. Mut. Reserved Fund Life
Ass’n, 51 A. 1066, 1067 (Conn. 1902) (Performance was “rendered impossible through the existence
of such facts as by the law of contract will excuse the performance of such a condition.”).
133
363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES
83, 103-04 (1977). In Transatlantic, the plaintiff shipping company signed an agreement to ship
wheat. The contract stated that the wheat would be moved 10,000 miles from Gavelston to Iran by
way of the Suez Canal in Egypt. Once the ship had departed, Egypt closed the canal to all vessels as
a response to international conflict. Plaintiff had no choice but to re-route the ship around the Cape
of Good Hope, an extra distance of over 3000 miles, and arrived in Iran several weeks behind
schedule. Plaintiff eventually sued the defendant United States to cover the additional expenses of
travel. Transatlantic Financing, 363 F.2d at 314-15. The court found the new route to be an
“unexpected development,” the risk of which had not been assumed by either party in the contract.
Id. at 316. However, the court found that the United States should have been on notice of “abnormal
risks” involved in shipping through Egypt, and thus the impracticability doctrine was applied to
discharge plaintiff’s contractual obligation to ship through Egypt. Id. at 319. This case illustrates the
unusual situation of a seller seeking impracticability, but the court’s reasoning on the issue of
impossibility discharge is applicable in all contexts.
134
Mortenson v. Scheer, 957 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Wyo. 1998); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §
667 (2007) (“[A] party claiming impossibility has the burden of proving the defense.”).
135
Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 401 (1998), aff’d, 308 F.3d 1283
(Fed. Cir. 2002). In other words, the contracting parties enter an agreement that rests on a basic
assumption but later face an event so contrary to that assumption that the very basis of the agreement
is altered. The U.C.C. describes this event as an “unforeseen supervening circumstance not within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.” U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (2001).
136
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 661 (2007). Types of events that have regularly been
found to constitute unforeseen events for impracticability purposes include war and natural disasters,
while mere changes in market conditions have not. BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(b).
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cases have held that “subjective impossibility,” that is, the type of
impossibility that is “personal to the promisor and is not inherent to the
nature of the act to be performed,” generally does not excuse a party
from failing to perform his or her contractual obligations.137 However,
these cases do not deal with “changes in heart” or mental inability as a
contractual defense, but rather concern one party’s ability to compensate
the other with money.138 A well-accepted exception to the objective
impossibility rule is the physical death of an essential party to the
contractual transaction.139 Thus, the physical change of death will relieve
a contracting party, and its successors, of otherwise binding duties.140
Likewise, courts have held that “supervening physical or mental
disability” of a person who is under a contractual duty is “similar in its
effect to death.”141 The failure to perform a contract that does not require
personal performance is not excused, but where the act to be performed
is one that only the promisor is competent to perform, the obligation is
discharged if performance is prevented by mental disability.142 If the
existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a
contractual duty, that person’s incapacity, which makes performance
impossible, may be regarded as “an event,” the nonoccurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.143 Thus, if a
party that had contracted to perform personal services at some point
becomes disabled, then the obligation to perform that duty is considered
“extinguished.”144 Additionally, it has been concluded by courts that
“sickness is an act of God that will excuse the failure to perform.”145
137

17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 661 (2007).
E.g., Marshick v. Marshick, 545 P.2d 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (discharge due to
impossibility was not allowed due to husband’s financial inability to pay money pursuant to divorce
agreement); Martin v. Star Pub. Co., 126 A.2d 238 (Del. 1956) (voluntary discontinuance of
publishing company did not discharge contractual duty to financially compensate plaintiff).
139
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 670 (2007) (“[E]ven without a provision in the contract
excusing performance, the death of a party will excuse further or subsequent performance if the acts
to be done are of a personal nature . . . .”).
140
Id.
141
Id. § 672; see also Wasserman Theatrical Enter. v. Harris, 77 A.2d 329 (Conn. 1950)
(holding that actor, who had throat ailment, had “reasonable apprehension that his health would be
seriously jeopardized if contract was performed, and that therefore defendant, was not liable for
cancellation of contract”). The Wasserman court stated that “an agreement for personal services, in
the absence of a manifested contrary intention, is always subject to a condition implied by law, that a
person who is to render services shall be physically able to perform at the appointed time.” Id. at
330; Holton v. Cook, 27 S.W.2d 1017 (Ark. 1930) (holding that because a young student became
wholly incapacitated from pursuing her studies at the school by reason of defective eyesight, she was
relieved of any contractual duty to pay tuition to the school).
142
See Salvemini v. Giblin, 125 A.2d 732, 734 (N.J. App. Div. 1956), aff’d, 130 A.2d 842
(N.J. 1957) (An agreement, dealing with personal services, was deemed no longer possible of
performance because of one party’s confinement in a mental institution: “[The contract] is deemed
dissolved by disability which renders its performance impossible according to the evident intention,
just as in the case of death.”).
143
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 672 (2007).
144
Id.
145
Id.
138
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In applying the impossibility doctrine to the conscientious
objection context, the voluntary enlister must first show that the
impracticability of performing the contractual obligations came about
through no fault of his or her own.146 In essence, this means that the
applicant must demonstrate that the claim was not the result of his or her
own choosing.147 Implicitly, discharge cases have already been dealing
with this issue when assessing conscientious objection applications.148
The military requires a conscientious objection applicant to be honest
and forthright about the reasons for seeking discharge and this
requirement is embodied in the “sincere and deeply held” prong of 32
C.F.R. § 75.5.149 Therefore, if an applicant were to claim newfound antiwar beliefs based on moral or religious conscientious objection, he or she
must not have ulterior motives under either the existing 32 C.F.R. § 75.5
or the proposed impossibility doctrine.150 Such ulterior motives would
cast doubt upon the sincerity of the applicant’s assertion that the request
for discharge is based solely on a belief that war is wrong.151 Similarly,
under the impossibility doctrine, any ulterior agenda or motivation for
release would fail the “no fault” requirement since the applicant is, in
essence, actively choosing to value personal desires to avoid combat over
the duty to serve. To put this more in more exact terms, the applicant
cannot claim that the impracticability of performance was brought about
146

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
The Supreme Court in Welsh said that conscientious objector status should be denied
to anyone who makes a claim based on personal or political reasons. Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970).
148
See, e.g., Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2005) (placing weight on
evidence that petitioner applied for discharge status only after his unit had been activated in support
of Iraqi Freedom); Kwon v. Sec’y of the Army, No. 06-14825, 2007 WL 1059112, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 9, 2007) (petitioner, after attending medical school at the Army’s expense, applied for
discharge status upon receiving word “that he was to report to active duty . . . upon the completion of
his residency”); Jashinski v. Holcomb, 482 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (denying
applicant discharge due in part to the fact that she did not apply for discharge until after her unit was
activated for combat and “she was taking no supportable actions in support of her new beliefs”).
149
The factors that courts consider in determining an applicant’s depth of conviction
include timing of application, opposition to a specific war rather than war in general, whether the
applicant had confided in close friends and relatives regarding the beliefs, and whether there has
been some outward indication of, or change of lifestyle in accordance with, the newfound anti-war
beliefs. These factors deal with whether the applicant is making good faith claims about his or her
reasons for desiring discharge from military duty. See infra note 151.
150
This sentiment is embodied in the requirement that conscientious objection beliefs
may not be based on personal or political beliefs, or as a result of any one specific war. Welsh, 398
U.S. at 342-43; see also 32 C.F.R. 75.3(b) (1999) (Applicants may not claim conscientious objection
based upon “a belief which rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, expediency or
political views.”).
151
See, e.g., Alhassan, 424 F.3d at 525 (denying discharge when application filed shortly
after receiving deployment to combat order and applicant held ant-war beliefs for a suspiciously
short period of time and had to tell anyone else in his life of his newfound beliefs); Roby v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying discharge because applicant claimed
conscientious objection only after being notified of impending transfer to sea duty); Koh v. Sec’y of
the Air Force, 719 F.2d 1384, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying applicant discharge in part because
she had made two previous applications for discharge on grounds other than conscientious objection
to war); Jashinski 482 F. Supp. 2d at 793, 795 (denying applicant discharge due to suspicious timing
of application and lack of outward signs that belief was deeply held).
147
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through no fault of his or her own, because the applicant has consciously
decided to leave the military once other circumstances are viewed as
more attractive. In contrast, an applicant’s genuine conscientious objection
beliefs are not viewed, either by the military or courts, as a personal
choice.152 Rather, true conscientious objection is regarded as something
that develops in applicants regardless of intent.153
Second, the conscientious objection applicant must show that an
“event” occurred, the future existence of which was not contemplated by
either of the parties at the time of contracting.154 Thus, the question is
whether an enlister’s “change of heart” may be considered an “event”
and, more importantly, whether it can constitute the type of “event”
suggested by the Restatement. Historically, the impossibility doctrine has
been used in response to unexpected natural events.155 The classic
example of impossibility, outlined by Chirelstein, is Taylor v. Caldwell.156
Decided in 1863, the plaintiff rented a “rickety old music hall” from the
defendant for four summer days.157 Once plaintiff had expended a
relatively large sum of money in order to publicize a series of musical
and entertainment events that he planned to produce at the location, the old
hall suddenly and unexpectedly (and through the fault of no one) caught
fire and burned to the ground.158 Because defendant could no longer
provide the music hall to plaintiff on the days agreed upon, plaintiff sued
defendant for breach of contract.159 The court held that the defendant
should be excused from performing his contractual obligation, as such
performance had been rendered impossible by the fire.160 Both parties simply
assumed the music hall would still exist on the days agreed upon, and such
existence was essential to the performance of the contract.161 Since, due to
the fault of neither party, this essential element of the contract no longer
existed, the court discharged the contractual duties of both parties.162
Aside from supernatural acts of God and Mother Nature, there
are other situations in which the impossibility doctrine may be applied.
The Restatement says that “[i]f the existence of a particular person is
necessary for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as
makes performance impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of
152

See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340; Wiggins v. Sec’y of the Army, 751 F. Supp. 1238, 1240
(W.D. Tex. 1990) (Bona fide conscientious objection beliefs cannot be “merely excuses for avoiding
combat.”).
153
See supra note 149. In other words, an applicant may not choose when and where to
become a conscientious objector.
154
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
155
BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(b).
156
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at 162-65.
157
Id. at 162.
158
Id.at 163.
159
Id.
160
See id.
161
Id. at 163.
162
Id. at 163-64.
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which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”163 This
would seem to suggest that the Restatement takes a similar approach as
earlier common law cases regarding physical and mental deficiencies or
alterations occurring to one of the parties subsequent to contracting; that
is, that such alterations, like death, affecting an essential party may be
used to excuse the obligations of either or both parties.164
A conscientious objection applicant’s “change of heart” or
“epiphany” concerning war and killing may be regarded as an
agreement-altering “event,” and thus a mental impediment to the
fulfillment of contractual military duties. Like other mental ailments
recognized by courts, a sincere and deeply held realization that fighting
is impossible is a drastic and often unavoidable change in mental state.165
This change in mental state (again, when felt both sincerely and deeply),
comes about through no fault of the affected party and may have an
equal or stronger effect on the individual’s ability to perform than any
purely physical impediment.166 In such circumstances, it seems
appropriate to consider such a change as an unintended and
unforeseeable event, the occurrence of which renders the enlistment
contract incapable of being honored.
Finally, a party seeking to invoke the impossibility defense must
not have borne the risk of the unforeseen event occurring.167 In other
words, if the party seeking discharge of contractual duty based on an
“event” had either “expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of [the
event’s] occurrence,” performance may not be excused regardless of
whether the other elements of impossibility have been satisfied.168 The
clearest way to determine risk allocation is to examine the actual contract
between the parties.169 Many times, contracts contain risk allocation
provisions (also termed force majeure clauses) designed to protect one
party from the undesirable effects of a future unlikely event.170 In the
military enlistment contract context, there is no such clause.171 While it is
true that modern military enlisters oftentimes must certify in writing that
they are not conscientious objectors,172 this does not necessarily qualify
163

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1981 ) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 138-144.
165
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
166
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
167
BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d) (“As with mistake, the risk allocation is often the
dispositive issue in impracticability cases.”); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 665 (2007)
(“Impossibility is not an excuse where the promisor has indicated an intent to assume the risk of
performing despite it, or where the language or the circumstances of the contract indicate that the
risk has been allocated to the party asserting the defense.”).
168
BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
See Armed Forces of the U.S., Enlistment/Recruitment Document, DD Form 4/1 (Aug.
1998), available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/pdf/enlistment.pdf.
172
See id.
164
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as an explicit assumption of risk.173 Even if such a certification was found
to be an assumption of risk, that assumption is undermined by the
military’s own codes and regulations, which explicitly provide
procedures to allow for conscientious objection discharge.174 While
conscientious objection discharge is not a constitutionally-mandated
right, the military has nevertheless explicitly provided for such discharge
through statute.175 The existence of such regulations may be viewed as an
admission of acknowledgement on the part of the military regarding the
existence of future instances of conscientious objection, and thus an
assumption of risk on its part that such instances will continue to occur
from time to time.176 When recruiting large numbers of men and women
to perform war-related duties, it is reasonable to assume that some will
develop a sincere and deeply felt aversion to the agreement such that
performance is substantially, if not entirely, frustrated. Therefore, since
the discharge applicant has not been made to bear the risk of later
developing conscientious objection beliefs, he or she may raise the
impossibility defense to be excused from contractual duty.
In sum, this Note argues that a contractual paradigm is the most
appropriate framework through which to assess the military/enlister
relationship.177 Within that framework, the contractual defense of
impossibility becomes the most viable option for conscientious objectors
seeking discharge from their military obligations.
V.

CONCLUSION

As alluded to earlier, it is conceded that this contractual
approach to the military conscientious objector issue is, at best, a subtle
departure from current practice, in terms of practical importance.178 At
worst, it begs the very question being asked: the initial question of “How
do you know when someone is worthy of conscientious objector status
and discharge?” has been replaced by the equally ambiguous “How do
you know when performing one’s military duties is impossible?” While
this very real criticism is acknowledged, it is proposed that the true
advantage to the contractual approach lies not in its day-to-day
application, but in the collateral effects it would produce.
173

“The question is whether the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances
show that the risk of subsequent events, whether or not foreseen, was assumed by the promisor.”
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 665 (2007) (emphasis added).
174
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
176
Similarly, the existence of insurance is often viewed as an admission of assumption of
risk. Thus, in the case of the music hall burning down in Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863)122 Eng. Rep.
309 (K.B.), it may be argued that had the hall’s owner insured the property, he would have assumed
the risk of it being destroyed and thus caused the fulfillment of certain agreements impossible.
BLUM, supra note 130, § 15.7.3(d).
177
See supra Part III.
178
See supra INTRODUCTION.
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First, the contractual approach to conscientious objection
discharge, unlike the current military regulation, would accurately reflect
the character and nature of today’s military/enlister relationship. This
relationship is purely contractual, based upon the enlister’s willful intent
to be bound by the terms of the agreement, and the military’s reasonable
reliance on that expression of intent when providing extensive resources
and benefits.179 This element of exchange between the parties is
something that should be recognized.180 The current approach to
conscientious objection discharge does not adequately contemplate this
relationship, by giving undue advantage to the enlister in breaking his or
her contractual duties in some jurisdictions.181
Second, and more importantly, the contractual impossibility
defense to military duty would mend the judicial split regarding the
proper application of 32 C.F.R. § 75.182 By requiring an applicant to
prove that military service is impossible, courts implicitly would be
asking applicants to prove that their anti-war beliefs are of such sincerity
and depth of conviction that denial is not an option. Applicants would be
required to demonstrate, for example, a willingness to go to jail rather
than betray their beliefs, or point to significant and appreciable changes
in their lifestyle in accordance with this new mindset. These factors have
already been employed by courts in an effort to determine depth of
conviction.183 These factors make particular sense for prima facie nonobjectors, who have already certified that they have no conscientious
objections to war at the time of enlistment.184
Thus, the contractual impossibility doctrine would eliminate the
conflicting views held by different courts in various circuits by
reinforcing the “depth of conviction” camp.185 It would overrule the
179
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[his] convictions . . . .”); Roby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding no legitimate outward signs of depth of conviction when “[applicant’s] beliefs are based
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2006) (After the military and court inquired into applicant’s changes in lifestyle in accordance with
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“sincerity” camp by requiring courts to inquire deeper into the strength
of a conscientious objection applicant’s anti-war beliefs, rather than
allowing courts to stop after a mere sincerity inquiry.186 To prove that
military service is impossible, an applicant must not only be sincerely
opposed to war, but must also evince signs that this opposition is more
than mere “fleeting beliefs” or momentary “bursts of passion” described
in Roby.187 Ultimately, the more stringent requirements of the
impossibility doctrine protect the military by requiring conscientious
objectors to show more than a simple change of opinion regarding war.188
This protection is proper given the contractual character of today’s
voluntary military enlister and the reliance of the government in such
relationships.189 Thus, the impossibility doctrine tips the scales slightly in
favor of the military, in light of the changed nature of its recruiting from
compulsion to volunteerism.190
The impossibility doctrine may also protect conscientious
objectors. Under the existing law, applicants for conscientious objection
discharge are assessed differently in different jurisdictions.191 What may
pass as adequate proof of anti-war beliefs in one court may be deemed
insufficient in another.192 Treating conscientious objection claims as
analogous to the defense of contractual impossibility provides uniformity
among the courts, which, in turn, creates predictability for those seeking
discharge.193 Such predictability may increase the overall efficiency of
the conscientious objection discharge process.
Perhaps more importantly, the impossibility doctrine would
effectively eliminate the “modified depth of conviction” camp.194 The
contractual impossibility defense would require courts to examine
whether performance of the applicant’s military duties is impossible (i.e.
whether applicant’s anti-war beliefs are so strong that they physically
and mentally preclude performance), regardless of the source of the antiwar beliefs. Thus, anti-war beliefs rendering duty impossible, which stem
from traditionally religious bases, are treated identically to anti-war
beliefs that have the same practical effect on the applicant but which are
borne out of purely moral or ethical codes of conduct. A purely
contractual approach wipes out any distinction in source created by the
modified depth of conviction camp because the impossibility doctrine
focuses solely on the strength and character of the applicant’s beliefs,
186
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not their source of development.195 Thus, the disparate treatment of
religious and non-religious beliefs, which Professor Greenawalt warned
against, disappears.196 Further, any potential establishment clause
violations disappear under this new standard as well, as there would be
no favoring of any one form of religion.197
Finally, the impossibility doctrine is consistent with the military
deference doctrine.198 By requiring applicants to have beliefs that are
both sincere and deeply held, courts will be honoring the military’s
discharge procedures that require beliefs to be both sincere and deeply
held.199 Similarly, the contractual approach remains true to the plain
language of the military’s current regulation 32 C.F.R. § 75, which
explicitly states that an applicant’s beliefs must be “sincere and deeply
held.”200
In conclusion, the contractual approach to conscientious
objection discharge is more appropriate than the current regulation and
its various judicial interpretations given the current character of the
modern enlister and the nature of the military/enlister relationship. This
new approach would provide a more comprehensive and streamlined
application of the military’s conscientious objector assessments as it is
devoid of superfluous analyses.201 Finally, such an approach provides
appropriate protection to both sides of the military/enlister relationship
and ultimately promotes uniformity of interpretation and application
within the military and among the courts.
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